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1 
INTRODUCTION: BUREAUCRACY AND COLLEGIALITY AT 
THE INTERORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL  
Economists have long focused on markets as exchange mechanisms, and many 
economic sociologists have also used the same approach. This emphasized the 
importance of the price mechanism and the social embeddedness of economic 
transactions among actors, whether individuals or organizations. Focusing on the 
production side of economic activity underlines the fact that society is a society 
of organizations (Presthus, 1962; White, 1986; Stokman et al., 1985; Coleman, 
1990; Perrow, 1991), with specific social mechanisms underlying collective 
action. But saying that society is an organizational society is also equivalent to 
saying that its intrinsically multi-level dimension should frame – much more 
than it currently does – sociologists’ perspective on human, including economic, 
activity. In our view, this additional focus reframes analyses of both market 
exchange and social exchange (Blau, 1964) of resources as they are connected in 
production. This approach advocates new combinations of theories of individual 
action and theories of collective action. Within such a perspective, priority is 
given here to the study of social exchange and cooperation among 
interdependent entrepreneurs, at the intraorganizational and interorganizational 
levels. In short, this study is about the social discipline that helps interdependent 
entrepreneurs in their collective action. Entrepreneurs are not conceived as 
individuals acting on their own, but as individuals interacting with, and investing 
in, other entrepreneurs as peers or quasi-peers in order to make collective action 
possible.  
The sociology of organizations has been able to design an ideal-typical  
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distinction between two forms of collective action at least at the intraorgani-
zational level. The two forms are bureaucracy and collegiality (Weber, 1978;
Crozier, 1963; Lazega, 2001a). The first imposes an order in routine produc-
tion; this order is built on formal hierarchy and rule circumvention by weaker
parties. The second organizes non-routine work based on formal equality
between interdependent entrepreneurs and identifiable social mechanisms of
cooperation that can only be understood on the basis of structural analyses of
multiplex social exchanges among economic actors.
For the last decades, structural analyses of social mechanisms taking place
within and between organizations have contributed, more or less intentionally,
to such a development in economic sociology. In this chapter, we sketch some
of the main aspects and limitations of this early development. We then review
new directions for research based on these expanded ambitions for current
economic sociology. In particular, we ask whether it is possible to extend to
the interorganizational level theory and models developed at the intraorgani-
zational level to account for collective action among interdependent entrepre-
neurs (especially when production is not routinized and products are not
standardized). A multi-level approach does not presuppose, for example, that
the relationship between a boss and his worker is the same as a relationship
between a large company and its subcontractor. Nor does it consider the
distinction between market and hierarchy as a useful one for economic sociol-
ogy.2 It is argued here that, although there is no scale invariance in the social
sciences, the idealÐtypical distinction between bureaucratic and collegial
forms of collective action can be useful to understand coordination at the
interorganizational level.
For example, at the interorganizational level, bureaucratic order is compa-
rable to State planning (ÔexternalÕ regulation of the economic world, redistrib-
ution of resources providing forms of ÔuniversalÕ solidarity and, sometimes, of
generation of change).3 In recent history, the social systems in which this order
was reified have not been able to muster the capacity to grow and innovate to
an extent comparable to that of less bureaucratic systems. In the latter, excep-
tional growth is often exclusively attributed to the dynamics of the Ômarket
economyÕ. In our view, it can also be attributed to the logic of politicized
social exchange and to the derived generic social mechanisms that make it
possible for an oligarchy of interdependent entrepreneurs to cooperate and get
involved in collective action by acting at the interorganizational level. This
level refers to the specific social phenomena that transform micro individual
and relational behaviour into social mechanisms that structure the collective at
the macro level. Generic social mechanisms Ð for example, that of generalized
exchange (that is, bounded solidarity), control and regulation Ð were identified
using a structural approach at the intraorganizational level, and concatenated
under the label of the Ôcorporate social capitalÕ (Lazega and Pattison, 2001).
148 Conventions and structures in economic organization
They combine entrepreneurial investments in relationships and the subsequent
quest for social niches and status competition, two phenomena that come out
of membersÕ rationality in social exchange. These phenomena make the meso
level a tangible and measurable reality. Our chapter asks how and to what
extent such meso-specific mechanisms, that is mechanisms relying on the
creation of social niches and more or less consistent forms of status, operate at
the interorganizational level.
Differences between the intraorganizational and the interorganizational
levels abound. At the macro level, more brutal and often more impersonal
forms of status Ð impersonal concentrations of resources that stress raw power
more than symbolic authority Ð are sought and used. The social niches that can
be found at the interorganizational level combine resources that are different
from social niches at the intraorganizational level. But similarities across
levels are also striking. For example, the idea of an intraorganizational social
niche is similar to that of a group of corporate actors depending on similar
resources and providing each other with such resources at a lower price than
would be expected with other exchange partners (Granovetter, 1994). Thus it
makes sense to try to extend to the interorganizational level reasoning that was
developed on interdependent entrepreneurs at the intraorganizational one, with
adjustments concerning kinds of resources, niches and statuses that make
sense at that higher level.
The existence of a meso level of analysis between the micro and the macro
levels is a precondition of this theory connecting individual and collective
economic behaviour. The current neostructural renewal of economic sociology
rests on the development of multi-level methods of data analysis (particularly
network analysis4) and on theories of action that do not accept a narrow
conception of individual rationality. Any sociological theory of economic
behaviour must rely on a realistic conception of the actors who produce and
exchange. Early structural sociology used conceptions of actors that ranged
between the automaton and the narrow costÐbenefit maximizer. Here we build
on an approach that seems more adequate for our purpose, one that brings in
politicized social exchange to account for the social mechanisms characteriz-
ing cooperation in the organizational society more generally. In effect, our
approach assumes that social mechanisms are triggered by relational choices
made by actors. Such choices select exchange partners and this selection is
understood as a niche-specific relational investment. Investments and their
underlying commitment (to exchange partners) contribute in turn to the emer-
gence of meso-level relational structures (regularities in the exchanges of
resources), but also trigger the generic social mechanisms mentioned above.
Without such mechanisms, we argue, collective action among interdependent
entrepreneurs would not be possible at the micro and macro levels.
In effect, relational investments and commitments are made under specific
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conditions characterizing social exchange. They appear to be dyadic in nature
(that is, to be ÔgiftsÕ), but they actually presuppose the existence of collectives
in which dyads are embedded. Commitments have a multi-level dimension.
They are made to actors (exchange partners) in social niches, using identity
criteria. They happen when actors can define their situation using appropriate-
ness judgments and identity criteria in the selection of exchange partners, from
whom they expect, directly or indirectly, successfully or unsuccessfully, reci-
procal investments and commitments (Lazega, 1992a). From the inside of the
quasi-group, such commitments are perceived as homophyly; from the outside
as density and embeddedness.
Contextualizing their economic activities in this way helps actors seek
social niches and compete for status (with attached authority arguments and
control of various kinds of resources). In effect, in our view, that would surely
be consistent with that of many organizational sociologists (Crozier and
Friedberg, 1977), these investments in exchange partners are part of actorsÕ
micropolitical behaviour. Actors tend to politicize their exchanges. They try as
much as they can to shape and reshape their opportunity structure by influ-
encing events at the meso level. This broadly conceived theory of rationality
in social exchange includes an actorÕs capacity to contextualize his or her
action. It brings in power and resource dependencies, but also social and
cultural disciplines subsumed under regulatory activities (Reynaud, 1989;
Favereau, 1989, 1999; Lazega, 1999a). In that respect, this neostructural
approach combines rational choice ideas with more symbolic interactionist
and strategic perspectives that will be outlined below Ð but also with formal
and systematic modelling.
This chapter thus outlines the contribution and limitations of a broadly
conceived structural approach to the study of organizations and markets. The
specificity of structural studies is in their use of network analysis as a method
for tracking and understanding flows and exchanges of resources, their control
and rule enforcement, and finally the negotiation of rules commanding such
flows and terms of exchanges. We mainly argue that the collegial model
(developed to analyse social mechanisms of non routine cooperation between
interdependent intrapreneurs at the intraorganizational level) can offer insights
into, and hypotheses for, the study of interorganizational cooperation between
interdependent entrepreneurs. Based on such an approach to economic activ-
ity, the strong difference between markets and organizations tends to be
replaced by the dialectic interplay between mechanisms characterizing
bureaucratic and collegial coordinations in each of the two contexts (intraor-
ganizational and interorganizational). The boundary between the two forms of
coordination, however, is a permanently shifting one. In effect, the forms
taken by actorsÕ social exchanges and politicized contextualization of their
actions Ð and therefore their efforts to reshape their opportunity structure Ð
150 Conventions and structures in economic organization
depend heavily on the extent to which their tasks in collective action can be
routinized, which is an unstable constraint. In our conclusion, we raise this
issue of a possible typology of equilibrium points stabilizing the mix of colle-
giality and bureaucracy that can be found in any real-life organization and
perhaps between them as well.
EARLY STRUCTURAL APPROACHES TO 
ORGANIZATIONS AND MARKETS
Network analysis in itself is a method, and its early users did not rely on many
complex behavioural assumptions. They often used a conception of action that
very generally looks at structural constraints imposed on the behaviour and
opportunities of members of a social setting (White, 1970) and of reactions to
such constraints (recorded as cutting and switching ties) that are eventually
supposed to lead to a change in the structure. In early structural explanations
in sociology, individuals were portrayed as being subject to particular sets of
constraints and opportunities defined by their social context, such as specific
and pre-existing social networks through which many resources can circulate
(White et al., 1976). Although this microÐmacro relationship has not been
examined systematically, the approach has been productive for the study of
organizations and for economic sociology. Of particular importance to under-
standing such constraints, social relations are part of the contextual conditions
influencing behaviour, including economic calculations. Early structural
approaches to organizations and markets use this method without, or with
minimal, theory of action: narrow rational choice and resource dependence
theory (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977), the latter being primarily interested in the
relationship between exchange, dependence and power.5
These constraints were theorized by the concepts of status and role without
much reflection on the use of authority that status provides or on the enactment
of such roles. In our view, this means that structural approaches should beware
of explanations of actorsÕ behavior and achievement simply by stating that
they were Ôat the right place, at the right timeÕ. This is where a theory of politi-
cized management of resource interdependencies and status competition is
needed.
Early Intraorganizational Network Studies
For the last 30 years, organizations have been among the social settings most
studied by network analysts: mines and shop-floors (Kapferer, 1969, 1972),
monasteries (Sampson, 1969; Breiger et al., 1975; Reitz, 1988), banks (Eccles
and Crane, 1988), advertising agencies (Ibarra, 1992), hospitals (Stevenson,
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1990), corporate law firms (Lazega, 1992b) and many others (Baker, 1984,
1992; Blau and Alba, 1982; Brass, 1984; Burt and Ronchi, 1990; Knoke and
Wood, 1981; Krackhardt, 1990; Lemieux, 1979, 1982; Shrader et al., 1989;
Thurman, 1980). Although some issues are dominant in this body of work
(organizational integration; relationship between centrality, autonomy and
power; influence of relationships on decision making; invisible inequalities),
intraorganizational studies using network analysis deal with a wide variety of
topics. For example, they describe the ways in which work, advice or friend-
ship ties cut across internal formal boundaries such as departmental or status
boundaries (Baker, 1992; Brass, 1984; Lazega, 1992b). They show how a
system filters information that reaches its members (Rogers and Agarwala-
Rogers, 1976) and influences the flows and exchanges of various resources
(Stevenson, 1990).
For example, a study by Burt (1992), following Harrison White and Mark
Granovetter, stresses the importance, in a social structure, of absences of rela-
tionships between actors. A Ôstructural holeÕ is defined as an absence of ties
between redundant others (that is contacts who give access to the same social
resources). Burt uses the concept to develop a measurement of structural
autonomy. An actor is autonomous when his or her contacts are not connected
to each other Ð for many possible reasons Ð and cannot put together strong
constraint on his or her behaviour. A simple example is that of two competing
suppliers that a firm can play off against each other. With the idea of structural
holes, Burt generalizes his theory of autonomy, adding that it provides bene-
fits in information and control that every entrepreneur needs to seize opportu-
nities. Absences of ties among others are exploitable by a tertius gaudens (in
the Simmelian sense of a third party taking advantage of a blocked situation
between two persons). With these premises, Burt develops a theory of this
entrepreneur. An actor whose network is rich in structural holes will benefit
from this structural feature when he can play them against each other or
become an intermediary. On the basis of this advantage, a productive Ôsocial
capitalÕ, he or she will be in a better position to win in selection processes such
as promotions. Actors paralysed in positions where they have to manage many
heterogeneous relations simultaneously and where they have few opportuni-
ties to become unavoidable intermediaries, are destined for quick burnout.
Burt thus pushes his structural theory of social capital towards a theory of
inequality and selectivity of social systems. His work leads to a focus on
actorsÕ manipulation of relations (network surgery including cutting and
adding ties from and to oneÕs network) and cooptation as a defence mechanism
(if you canÕt beat them, join them) where a strategic player tries to avoid
competition or diminish his or her dependence upon a constraining party.
These manÏuvres can also be indirect (Gargiulo, 1993; Lazega and Vari,
1992; Lazega and Lebeaux, 1995; Lazega, 1995; Lazega and Krackhardt,
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2000). In BurtÕs early approaches, membersÕ behaviour and management of
ties are assumed to be driven exclusively by costÐbenefit calculations.
Early Interorganizational Networks Studies
Many resources also flow among organizations, for example capital, person-
nel, information, goods (Aldrich and Marsden, 1988; Galaskiewicz and
Marsden, 1978). In addition, as shown by studies such as that of Bauer and
Cohen (1981) or Stokman et al. (1985), interorganizational relationships are
also characterized by a great number of Ônon economicÕ exchanges. Again the
dominant literature on this field is that of resource dependence theory. These
approaches differentiate themselves from atomistic approaches by defining the
environment as a set of other organizations. For example, organizational
systems can be centralized and hierarchical, as with a group with a dominant
holding company at the top, or fragmented in a large number of small organi-
zations, they can be disorganized as in the beginning of an industry or in a
highly competitive system (Mintz and Schwartz, 1985); or display a limited
number of coalitions as in the system of financial and marital alliances
between houses in 15th century Florence (Padgett and Ansell, 1993).
Davis and Powell (1992) identify three different directions taken by
research on interorganizational networks. The first two remain merely descrip-
tive. The third develops a complete approach which has been influential in
economic sociology.
The first direction is concerned with formation and maintenance of these
networks. It uses mainly interlock ties (that is, ties between two companies
created by the fact that one person sits on both boards). The reason for this
interest in these ties goes back to problems raised at the beginning of the 20th
century by cartels, collusion and antitrust action taken to be consistent with an
ideology of open competition in capitalist economies (Mizruchi, 1982, 1992;
Schwartz and Mizruchi, 1988). The second direction is represented by studies
of the way position in the network of organizations, or organizational Ôfield Õ
(DiMaggio, 1986), influences corporate actions, for example philanthropic
giving (Galaskiewicz, 1979, 1989), top managersÕ political ideology (Useem,
1984), choice of a defence strategy against hostile takeover bids (Davis, 1991),
and many others. In the same direction, Laumann and Knoke (1987) studied
empirically the influence of interorganizational networks on lobbying and
policy making in two ministries (health and energy) in the United States.
Finally, the third direction is concerned with evaluating profitability and
chances of survival of companies given their position in the informal structure
of their sector (Burt, 1983, 1992; Burt and Talmud, 1993). Market stability
(Burt, 1988) and firm survival in a competitive arena are also among the main
dependent variables.6 For example, Barley et al., (1992) try to explain strategic
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behaviour of companies in the new biotech industry, behaviour such as
alliances and management of uncertainties arising from interdependencies
with competitors. They show that one cannot explain these firmsÕ behaviour
without knowing their position in the structure created by all the organizations
of the same sector. Analysing relationships between 900 organizations, as well
as 700 contracts among them, they show that the firms may be clustered in
blocks in which members tend to have the same alliance strategies and same
level of participation in various segments of the market. Another example in
the financial sector is BakerÕs (1984, 1990) empirical study of the informal
structure of the Chicago options exchange. He has shown that price volatility
of some products is higher at the periphery of the structure than at its centre,
thus depending on the status of brokers.
This approach has generated fundamental ideas with regard to cooperation
and competition in collective action. Pioneering work by Harrison White
(1981a, 1981b, 1988, 2001) renews economic sociology by emphasizing the
importance of the social structure of markets and the way in which social rela-
tions (as opposed to prices) regulate economic behaviour of competitors on
specific markets, or the way in which the social structure influences pricing
itself and other behaviour on competitive markets (Burt, 1992; Burt and
Talmud, 1993; Leifer and White, 1988). White built an early sociological
model of the market economy (recently extended, White, 2001) based on the
existence of niches and blocks of producers watching each otherÕs revenues,
commitments to volume and choices of quality of products. As in
SchumpeterÕs theory, producers do not focus first on demand, but on other
producers. By definition, exchanges are never bilateral, always multilateral
(and thus politicized). Instead of converging towards a single optimal price,
they attempt to find a niche (defined as a combination of volume and the qual-
ity/price ratio) that allows them to create an ever-precarious market situation.
Markets are thus organized from the perspective of niche-seeking producers
and tend to segment into temporarily protected but fragile non-competitive
economic niches.
It is interesting to notice here that several authors have used the concepts of
niche to account for economic phenomena. In his seminal paper (1981b) and
book (2001), White looks for conditions under which a market comes into
existence and sustains itself. He considers a niche to be a market footing for a
single firm and a single product, created mainly by consumersÕ quality judg-
ment about (and ranking of) the product offered by this firm. This niche is thus
socially constructed by producers watching each other, and by a Ôtypical
consumerÕsÕ decision; notice that this construction is not a form of collective
action because there is no joint and coordinated involvement of producers and
consumers in the process. Obviously, this does not necessarily overlap with
the definition of a social niche provided below as a set of exchange partners
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allowing easier access to multiple resources and developing common identifi-
cations and commitments. In the new version of his model, White (2001)
Ôturns the downstream model inside outÕ and models the behaviour of produc-
ers concerned with their upstream connections. But although, paradoxically,
Harrison White is one of the pioneers of structural approaches to markets, his
own model assumes the existence of an underlying social structure (connect-
ing producers) without actually looking at the social and political mechanisms
that maintains it (including professional associations, political parties, country
clubs and non-profit organizations). Managers are concerned with the size of
their production runs, not with joining or creating groups of organizations to
concentrate their power or deal with their interdependencies. In WhiteÕs view,
a niche is not a segment of a market in which actors agree to a partial suspen-
sion of strategic behaviour and competition, in exchange for more control of
each otherÕs behaviour, be it informal. It is mainly a monopolistic position of
the firm to be secured and derived from a characteristic of the product and to
be obtained from the typical consumerÕs quality orderings. Thanks to network
analytical partition methods, one finds here familiar segmentation processes
such as that characterizing labour markets (Granovetter, 1985, 1992;
Swedberg, 1990, 1992).7
Other work in this third direction (Berkowitz et al., 1979; Berkowitz, 1988;
Berkowitz and Fitzgerald, 1995; as well as Mokken and Stokman, 1978), uses
capital ownership ties combined with control interlock ties to define entities
called enterprises. A company in a context of multinational groups operating
at the global level is not a unit of analysis that must attract interest first in order
to define a market. Berkowitz defines market areas as clusters of companies
producing, distributing and consuming various goods in an upstreamÐdown-
stream flow. This new overlay offers a picture of competitive markets at vari-
ous levels of complexity. These models are more realistic than definitions of
markets in technological terms in that they bring out institutional structures
that protect market areas. Network analysis helps identify classical forms of
market relationships (such as monopolies, duopolies, oligopolies or monop-
sonies) as well as unnamed but simple and constraining socioeconomic struc-
tures.
This work often goes beyond simple monograph of informal structures of
organizations or of interorganizational systems to test embeddedness hypothe-
ses on the articulation of structure, access to resources and behaviour. They
build sociological theories reinterpreting economic activity through a detailed
and ethnographic knowledge of the business world and its relationships with
the institutional, local and national, context. Such theories are not yet complete
and able to explain collective action coordinated by mechanisms other than
competition. However, their capacity to explain many economic phenomena
reformats the debate between sociology and economy in the grand tradition of
Interdependent entrepreneurs and social mechanisms 155
Weber and Polanyi, who conceive of markets as social institutions facilitating
exchanges, that is, more than a pricing mechanism. It shows that it is useless
to imagine interorganizational structures of cooperation that do not rely on
multiple social resources and formal organizations, for example interorganiza-
tional ÔstructuresÕ that would be made exclusively of contracts. By isolating
the network of contracts from a formalized and organized social exchange, one
kills its specificity.
Most of this early work was often based exclusively on narrow resource
dependence theories taking into account social embeddedness. As shown by
Lindenberg (1996), few behavioural assumptions, other than the prevalence of
short term costÐbenefit theories mitigated by social ties, are used to explain
membersÕ behaviour. It is, however, insufficient to explain how actors gener-
ate structures that encourage cooperation (as opposed to competition), or how
to account for high levels of social exclusion provoked by contemporary
market economies (Perrow, 1992). Therefore the next generation of structural
sociologists has been trying to enrich the definition of the actor that is used to
account for economic action. Specifically, since actors get involved in, and
manage, exchanges of multiple resources, this calls for a theory of social
exchange and barter.
RATIONALITY, SOCIAL EXCHANGE AND STRUCTURE:
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MESO LEVEL
Beyond utilitarian and embeddedness studies, a broader structural approach
adds behavioural assumptions and multiplexity to a sociological theory of
economic action. It assumes a form of actorsÕ rationality that is compatible
with social exchange, not only with market exchange. Social exchange
includes calculations, but also symbolic activity8 such as appropriateness
judgments, commitments and relational investments (based on boundary
management and identity claims) and value judgments (negotiation of precar-
ious values and norms) that allow individuals to contextualize and politicize
their calculations and exchanges, at least by selecting reference groups, prior-
ities in allegiances and authorities (Lazega, 1992a, 1997; Favereau, 1998,
1999). In our view, it is useful to assume that actors invest in relationships in
order to act at the meso level, to try to reshape their opportunity structure, that
is, to try to structure the context of their interactions They can do so, for exam-
ple, in the process of selecting exchange partners. These selections are neither
random, nor entirely free, nor entirely determined. As seen in the previous
section, they are themselves subject to previous structural and normative
constraints. But they nevertheless reflect the idea that actors invest in rela-
tionships in order to make some direct or indirect reciprocity possible. Actors
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often assume that they will benefit from this reciprocity in social niches, that
is, if others share the same identities and rules of exclusivity. Rationality from
a broadly conceived structural approach is inseparable from the processes
characterizing social exchange.
One example that illustrates this approach to social exchange is the impor-
tance of barter. In economics, barter is a slow, expensive and highly restrictive
way to do business. The barter economy is inefficient compared to the cash
economy. Barter transactions are opaque and approximate. At the macro level,
barter undermines good government because it makes tax collection difficult,
tax evasion easier (for example, the tax man has to work harder, with much
less precise information to understand a companyÕs business). A country
cannot prosper unless barter is replaced by conventional money. For econo-
mists, people barter, for example, when inflation is too high or because they
make goods that are unsalable at any price and barter then becomes a way for
them to restore price flexibility. There is barter entrenchment. It also becomes
easier for people in power to manage barter to their advantage. However, in
social life, barter is much more widespread than is usually acknowledged. It is
used much more often than cash for many types of exchanges. And it has its
own rules. It is indeed much more restrictive and it falls under a logic of
membership, a symbolic logic; it is much more demanding in terms of soli-
darity with ÔoneÕs own peopleÕ. Basically, it identifies criteria that drive the
barter economy, that is, a principle that is the exact opposite of the perfect
market mechanism, in which people tend to be anonymous and unrelated. The
barter economy is much more visibly politicized than the cash economy. And
it is much more pervasive in the economy than conventional economists
acknowledge. In effect, pricing many goods or resources is next to impossible
for actors involved in transactions connected to production and collective
action. This is especially the case for knowledge.
In addition, investments in relationships are not independent of status
comparisons. In effect, actors need to define terms of social exchange, and
status is an enviable position from which to negotiate such terms. The dynam-
ics of status auctions in brainstorming is a good illustration: it is a multiplex
process relying on several forms of status (Lazega and Pattison, 2001). There
is, however, a permanent risk of opportunism attached to such relational
investments. They therefore presuppose a definition of Ð and possibly a resort
to Ð authorities. A social niche cannot operate on its own, without such exter-
nal authorities. The latter are central in the processes of the definition of the
situation, but also for the meso-level social mechanisms such as exchange or
regulatory deliberation.
In our approach, we use the concept of rationality in a wide sense. Rational
action means that one has a goal (or a series of competing or successive goals)
and a series of means to reach these goals. For example, niche seeking is not
Interdependent entrepreneurs and social mechanisms 157
an exclusive goal in itself but a strategy to reach a series of higher order goals.
Niche seeking is sometimes based on a series of intuitive relation-specific
investments guided by homophyly. Therefore it belongs to a form of rational-
ity that is not exclusively concerned with costÐbenefit calculation. The fact
that it is not always experienced as rational in a narrow sense does not mean
that it is not rational in a broader sense. The criterion of what is rational is not
necessarily what is experienced as such on the spot. Therefore attributing such
a form of rationality to interdependent entrepreneurs cannot be considered to
be a form of Ôscholastic fallacyÕ denounced by Bourdieu with regard to narrow
rational choice theories. On the contrary, this form of rationality can be shown
to be highly correlated to position in the structure (Lazega and van Duijn,
1997).
In the next section, we provide an overview of the contribution of strategic
analysis and symbolic interaction as underlying sets of assumptions concern-
ing actorÕs behaviour when involved in social exchange. We then look at their
implications for economic activity at the individual level. Finally, we raise the
issue of extending such a view of actorsÕ behaviour at the interorganizational
level.
Resource Interdependencies and Investments in Relationships
Actors depending on each other for resources are rational when they look for
social niches, that is, contexts where their investments in relationships (with
such selected partners) have a better chance of ensuring reciprocity both at the
dyadic level and via generalized exchange (indirect reciprocity), and make
social exchange, or barter, possible. They are trying to shape as much as possi-
ble their opportunity structure. This of course depends on their acceptance by
others in the niche, so decisions to invest are not decisions that they can make
exclusively on their own. These investments are the basis of generic social
mechanisms that are multiplex and multi-level: multi-level because niches
create a microÐmeso and mesoÐmacro articulation; and sometimes multiplex
because some of these investments are exchanges of various kinds of
resources needed for collective action (for example, both armÕs-length and
ÔembeddedÕ ties, as described by Lazega and Pattison, 1999, or Uzzi, 1999.
Once investments in relationships have been made and once niches provide
such positive returns, it can even make sense to risk (apparently sacrifice)
some of these relationships themselves for the common good (see the case of
lateral control regimes below) and for legitimacy needed to change the rules
or maintain the status quo.
In other words, relation-specific investments are triggers for social mecha-
nisms of cooperation. Before developing this proposition, it is useful to
acknowledge two bodies of work that are particularly useful to this structural
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theory of social exchange focusing on investments in relationships and
attempts to reshape opportunity structures. The first is an approach of power
in terms of resource interdependencies, the second is an approach to commit-
ment and identity. As we define it, social exchange requires both politicization
of these exchanges, or barters, and coorientation with exchange partners.
Trying to Reshape Opportunity Structures: the Contribution of
Strategic Analysis
An organizational approach to social life means, among other requirements,
that individuals must be seen as interdependent members who need to get
access to production-related resources (Crozier and Friedberg, 1977). At the
level of organizations as units, resource dependencies are even more obvious.
Because they rely on theories of power and resource dependencies, structural
analyses are close to theories of collective action such as the French school of
organizational analysis. Following the sociotechnical tradition of the 1950s,
these interdependencies can be functional, that is related to a formal division
of work, or structural, that is related to more informal circulation of all sorts
of resources through social relationships. In that respect, structural analysis is
compatible with what Crozier (1963; Crozier and Friedberg, 1977) calls
ÔstrategicÕ analysis. Indeed, the former presupposes the latter.9 This is particu-
larly the case because structural analysis offers sophisticated measurements of
resource interdependencies, status and power that are basic concepts of both
approaches. The latter rely on inductive approaches avoiding reification of the
notion of structure.
In effect, to the notion of formal structure, strategic analyses (Crozier,
1963; Crozier and Friedberg, 1977; Sainsaulieu, 1987) add the notion of a
concrete action system. This system is partly defined by the relationships that
are established among interdependent members in the organization or between
organizations. Part of the task of strategic analyses involves bringing out
patterns of informal relationships on which unexpected forms of order depend.
In the structural perspective too, actors contribute to the raising of structures
that end up constraining them. Formal and informal structures are now defined
in the same terms, those of resource dependencies. Notions such as power and
autonomy are measured in various types of centrality and constraint scores
that take into account the relational and systemic dimensions of these phenom-
ena. Structural advantage and disadvantage are made more visible.
Beyond these general similarities, structural and strategic analyses also
meet in the study of two fundamental dimensions of power games: first,
actorsÕ capacity to manage relationships, invest in them and disinvest; second,
in the ways in which they politicize their exchanges. Sainsaulieu (1977, 1987)
has long insisted on the type of trained capacities that members develop in
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order to Ôbecome actorsÕ Ð whether cognitive capacities (identifying key play-
ers and relationships among them) or manipulative capacities (creating coali-
tions, letting relations dissolve or cutting ties). Such an approach is very close
to that of Krackhardt (1987, 1990, 1992; Krackhardt and Hanson, 1993) and
his exploration of the relationship between power and perception of relations;
or to that of Kapferer (1969, 1972), Burt (1992) and other network analysts
interested in direct or indirect cooptation and influence (Brass, 1984;
Gargiulo, 1993; Lazega and Vari, 1992; Lazega and Lebeaux, 1995; Lazega,
2000b; Lazega and Krackhardt, 2000). As a moment (analytically speaking) of
politicized exchanges, the logic of regulatory work and deliberations has also
been closely tracked by Reynaud (1989).
Trying to Reshape Opportunity Structures: the Contribution of
Symbolic Interactionism
The contribution of symbolic interactionist theory to our assumptions concern-
ing social and economic behaviour is less straightforward. The easiest way to
theorize this connection is to use the notion of commitment underlying selec-
tion of exchange partners. Commitment to others, but also to shared identities,
is an old symbolic interactionist topic. From this perspective, social order is
constructed through meaningful, selfÐother interaction (Blumer, 1969) under
the ÔsurveillanceÕ of reference groups, an audience which is not necessarily
empirically present, but nevertheless exercising social control, and thus
constraining behaviour by judging of its appropriateness and legitimacy. In
this context, the question of the structure is raised in terms of institutional
constraints influencing negotiations of identities that, in turn, weigh on appro-
priateness judgments (McCall and Simmons, 1966; Lazega, 1992a). Since
most interactions take place in situations that are never completely structured,
nor necessarily clearly defined in actorsÕ minds, actors may not necessarily
know which of their identities will be involved, as a priority, in the current
interaction, and which behaviour is more appropriate given the commitment to
such identity. A phase of mutual identification, of identity negotiation and
hierarchization, is necessary for interactions to take place. Joint identification
with the image and attributes of a profession is all the more common in the
business world in that people have to Ôsell themselvesÕ in order to hold their
own. The link between the structure of the social setting and the interactive
processes which take place within them is theorized through analyses of this
negotiation.
Social exchange necessary for production cannot be theorized without the
notions of commitment, identity and appropriateness judgment. In collective
action, formal and informal identities are combined. A context can be
modelled as a set of formal identities bestowed upon some members, with
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their attached power and authority. The informal set of identities is not neces-
sarily recognized institutionally and thus rarely associated with authority.
ActorsÕ method of contextualization of behaviour is thus close to a symbolic
interactionist conception of rationality. Certainly, networks are not providing
actors with ÔpureÕ and ÔessentialÕ identities but with a sense of the appropri-
ateness in using formal attributes here and now when orienting or coorienting
behaviour. Identity is not a benefit that actors extract from belonging to a
network. It is a structural green light both for construction of ties (access to
resources) and for coorientation of actions within a specific context (formal
and informal structure) for oneÕs rules. This approach goes beyond embed-
dedness studies that do not often explain how actors use and develop social
ties for their exchanges and cooperation.
Another angle from which to grasp the conceptual proximity between
structural and symbolic interactionist theories comes from analysing Ôcrystal-
lizedÕ ways in which economic actors participate in social exchange. This
crystallization can be grasped through the notion of role as used in both
perspectives. As seen above, the conceptual link between structure and behav-
iour in network analysis is often provided by the notion of role, which can be
understood as the function performed from a position (for example a subset of
approximately structurally equivalent members), or as a specified combination
of relations compounding two or more different networks. Such operational-
izations of the concept of role, like any model, simplifies the description of
constraints on behaviour, especially because they are exclusively relational.
For critics (Brint, 1992; DiMaggio, 1991, 1992), the role of cultural (in the
sense of normative) orientations may be as important in the explanation of
actorsÕ behaviour, especially when structural constraints are multiple and
sometimes contradictory. For most general theories of action, such as that of
Nadel (1957), a role results from normative expectations and from relations
with associates carrying these expectations and sanctioning deviance. This is
true even if it may be difficult to find a relational basis for all rights and duties,
for instance by identifying authority figures that represent them or speak on
their behalf. Therefore roles are useful as a synthesis of individual and social
levels, but also of normative and relational dimensions.
Accepting that economic actors try to reshape their opportunity structure by
entering social exchanges as role performance does not mean subscribing to a
rigid conception of roles. Blumer (1969) sees roles as sets of informal rules
created and recreated through interactions, especially through negotiations
between individuals and their associates. Actors and their interactions
construct the roles and rules that govern their behaviour. Individuals partici-
pate in defining their own roles, which have many variations, and they usually
undergo change (Stryker, 1980; Stryker and Statham, 1985). In that sense, two
largely descriptive steps are involved in the analysis of roles. One is the
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description of the extent to which the informal definition of the role (role
making) is closely related to the formal definition (role taking). The second is
the description of the extent to which this redefinition is itself subject to rela-
tional constraints. These negotiations recreate and reshape roles, often with
dogmatic emphasis on (always temporary forms of) conformity and consensus
among stakeholders. IndividualsÕ role-related behaviour is determined by
expectations of their associates, and such expectations are themselves cultur-
ally coded. In order to link the institution and the individual, the structural
approach defines roles as sets of norms that are widely endorsed by actors in
their interactions, even if associates may change. At a very general level of
abstraction, this symbolic interactionist approach to social exchange is also
compatible with a conventionalist theory of economic activity. Indeed, rules
subsume relational and cultural devices that are needed to make economic
decisions, both calculating and interpretive.
In sum, individuals trying to reshape their opportunity structure can be
represented as strategic but interdependent entrepreneurs who seek contexts in
which they can find and exchange these resources at low cost. Once in such
contexts, they seek various forms of concentration of these resources so as to
be in a position to define the terms of such exchanges. This means that two
notions are important to a structural approach of organizations: social niches
and multidimensionality of status. Both are indispensable for membersÕ
durable commitment to a labour contract. They are basic components, not only
of production, but also of a series of relatively general mechanisms that
together characterize coordination of collective action from a structural
perspective.
But a structural approach is more than just a refinement of strategic analy-
sis and symbolic interaction. Access to production-related resources by inter-
dependent members, as well as participation in power plays, are particularly
visible in niche seeking and status competition. The latter activities are both
consequences of actorsÕ attempts to reshape their opportunity structures and
the building blocks of the social mechanisms that help them achieve coopera-
tion even with their competitors.
Interdependent Entrepreneurs Seeking Bounded Solidarity in 
Social Niches
Interdependent members of organizations must have access to various produc-
tion-related resources (for example clients, co-workersÕ goodwill, advice). The
social niche of an actor can be broadly defined as a subset of members of the
organization with whom the actor has succeeded in creating especially durable
exchange relations, whether directly or indirectly, as a consequence of his or
her previous (and mutual, although not necessarily symmetric) investments. It
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is a pool of partners with whom exchanges are characterized by a certain
density, which implies that sociologists can detect a niche through a strong
relational cohesion, if not a generalized exchange system (Lazega and
Pattison, 1999).10 Actors contextualizing their behaviour also detect the exis-
tence of niches, but they often use the criterion of a certain social homogene-
ity to do so: they use similarities (for example in terms of office membership,
or speciality, or hierarchical status) between exchange partners to identify the
boundaries of the niche in which they assume that dense exchanges do or will
take place (Lazega and van Duijn, 1997).11 Ideally, such niches operate as
pumps mixing and spreading various types of resources to members.
Members operate within micro structures such as niches, that are them-
selves part of a system of niches in the wider organization. Indeed, niches only
make sense in a system of niches. It is rational for members to be niche-seek-
ing because it is rational for them to look for multifunctional contexts that
provide them with resources needed to produce, and with relative protection
from rivalry and competition for these resources.12 The multifunctional char-
acter of niches means that several resources can be exchanged by members.
Indeed, such niches are also built for that very purpose, that is, to allow multi-
plex barters of resources without Ôgeneral equivalentÕ. Niche building is strate-
gic, but, once built, niches have the advantage of allowing partial suspension
of purely calculating behaviour (Ekeh, 1976). They help members, as
economic actors, identify partners with similar long-term interests and
combine, through identity criteria, these long term interests and management
of multiple resources. Niches and identities come together because they intro-
duce long term stability in membersÕ choices and definitions of interests.13
This stability is based on the intuition that common characteristics make long
term common interests more likely, and therefore the existence of indirect
reciprocity that is necessary to collective action. As seen above, there is no
barter without identities and a very important symbolic dimension. Therefore
they can be characterized by a form of bounded solidarity. This bounded soli-
darity is connected to a form of contextualization of action (Lazega, 1997) and
limited rationality, in the sense that members do not always use the same crite-
ria to evaluate the fairness of their multiplex barters. It can be measured in
several ways: for example, by the stability of membersÕ choices of exchange
partners; or by boundary management (Lazega, 1992a) allowing for the exis-
tence of generalized exchange cycles, that is, of indirect reciprocity, among
such partners; or by the presence of informal rules imposing multiplexity or
marginalizing, then excluding, members who grab all the credit for successful
actions.
To get access to such resources, members do not rely entirely on formal
organization and rules. They are selective in their relational choices, and this
selectivity, together with institutional constraints, produces patterns which are
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interesting for understanding exchanges in the firm. Members manage their
interdependence in their own ways, that are both economic and political
(Crozier and Friedberg, 1977). As seen above, to get access to such resources,
they enter exchanges that are multilateral and multiplex.14 The contextual
rationality that is at work in such exchanges plays with attributes and ties.15 It
intervenes in the process of resource allocation by using formal attributes in
ÔpoliticizedÕ ways or by introducing other particularistic attributes and preoc-
cupations (for example gender, or law school attended). The latter are more
informal and ad hoc; they are not necessarily officially recognized by the firm
as characteristics that should be used to promote cooperation and allocate
resources. The main concept to understand this stability and this process is that
of identification. As mentioned above, identity is usually a relatively stable
and multidimensional set of attributes that members use to make judgments of
appropriateness, define themselves and get recognition as sources of their
actions (for credit and accountability) on a continuing basis. In practice, an
actor is always ÔloyalÕ to some allegiance (represented by an attribute) while
ÔbetrayingÕ another (represented by another attribute). Identity is what intro-
duces time in action by defining long-term individual and collective interests.
Identities enter the exchange as bearings or markers or criteria for selection of
exchange partners. Members use identity criteria to choose exchange partners
who will presumably share values leading to some sort of solidarity. The idea
here is that identity is introduced in transfers and exchanges of resources to
avoid measuring the value of the heterogeneous resources in multiplex
exchanges. The use of identities in multiplex exchanges creates a form of
bounded solidarity.
In sum, a social niche offers its members resources, a sense of identity and
of common long-term interests, a context for the enforcement of their own
rules, and the stimulation that is needed to produce in common. Its generalized
exchange system sustains cohesive and durable work relationships in contexts
often dominated by flexibility and short-term calculations. It constitutes a
bounded solidarity bloc. But recall that it can also become a difficult and very
constraining environment, especially when members lose control of the status
competition process.
Interdependent Entrepreneurs Competing for Multiple Forms of Status
Together with seeking or building niches as appropriate and protected contexts
for part of their exchanges, members try to reshape their opportunity structure
by attempting to manage the exchanges that take place in them. In this context
of bounded solidarity, one way of influencing exchanges with colleagues is to
accumulate resources needed for production, thus reaching a form of status.
The role of status in the mechanisms supporting collegial organizations is
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complex. In general sociological theory, status refers to a memberÕs relative
position in the group, both in the formal hierarchy and in the networks of
exchanges in the group. In collegial organizations, status comes from contri-
butions to the firm, from credentials, from a history of achievements and
establishment of competence. It means that the individual is considered
worthy of being granted an extensive mandate, regarding both personal
responsibility and corporate responsibility to regulate community, profes-
sional or internal firm affairs (Bosk, 1979). This mandate is derived from Ð
and made measurable by Ð concentration of production-related resources, or
by the privileges that are granted to members who control such resources.
These privileges may include financial compensation, decision-making prior-
ities, more respectful treatment by peers, symbolic and moral licensing, as
well as escaping pressure for accountability, tests of commitment, and blame
for many errors. In addition to being less vulnerable to criticism from
colleagues, and being insulated from cross-pressures, members with status
have functional prerogatives including more freedom to select interesting
matters and cases on which to work, thus authoritatively deciding how such
cases will be handled and dividing the work among others.
It is not surprising, therefore, that members of a group compete for status,16
even if the latter comes with responsibilities, for example that of exercising a
form of leadership, of being responsible for the long-term future of the orga-
nization. Other members expect from them solutions to their collective action
problems and these convergent and constraining expectations play an impor-
tant role in the structuration of cooperation. Elites are challenged to solve
problems by alternating constraint and persuasion, to combine diverging inter-
ests of fractions hanging on to their rents within often confused and unstable
coalitions. They are supposed to help maintain solidarity within the organiza-
tion at large. But this leadership cannot be exercised without a concentration
of social resources. This is where a relational and structural definition of
power becomes important to understand status (Crozier and Friedberg, 1977).
In effect, it is often the concentration of social resources that allows members
to reach a form of status. And once in a leadership position, members need
these resources to perform, to use othersÕ dependencies and define terms of
exchanges.
From a structural perspective, the concept of status is a composite of titles
(official function) and accumulation of different types of social resources. This
composite character is translated by the existence of multiple forms of status
that can be used by actors to politicize their exchanges. Sociological classics
have long stressed the importance and many dimensions of social status and
social approval. Max Weber used to distinguish dimensions that were
economic (based on revenue), social (honour, prestige, not only from birth, but
from human capital Ð education) and political. For him, collective action is
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possible only because status has heterogeneous sources. As stressed by
Parsons, then by Bourricaud, the functions of leadership are always exercised
by several persons. The role of the leader is ÔdiffuseÕ, not specialized. This
multidimensionality of status is derived from the concentration of different
resources, from an endogenous heterogeneity (and not only an exogenous one,
as in Weber) of sources. For example, the official member, the most compe-
tent, the most popular, the most committed, all have some sort of status, and
participate in coordination of collective action.
The question may be raised of the relationships between these different
forms of status, if not their coexistence. Given that it is multidimensional, each
of its forms may or may not go hand-in-hand with another form, often capi-
talized by someone else. For the individual, heterogeneity of sources of status
may correspond to various levels of status consistency. In fact, it is the possi-
bility of playing, at the individual level, with this status inconsistency that
gives oligarchic systems the capacity to maintain themselves in equilibrium
and to define a hierarchy of values (for more on this, see about this point the
end of this chapter). In collegial systems, for example, multidimensionality of
status comes usually with processes that help the organization maintain a
balance of powers between oligarchs. Heterogeneity of sources of status often
mean that an oligarchy reaches a form of equilibrium or stability based on the
interdependency of oligarchs. Cohesion in the oligarchy is reached by a
balance of powers and integration  la Montesquieu (Lazega, 1992b, 2000a;
Kuty, 1998). Maintaining heterogeneity and interdependence of forms of
status is often the condition under which rivalry among oligarchs leads to
equilibrium.
Investments in Relationships and Social Mechanisms
The fact that actors are niche-seeking entrepreneurs, status competitors and
judges of the appropriateness of their own (as well as othersÕ) social
exchanges is important to understanding sociologically economic activity.
Reaching and enforcing economic decisions are processes that depend heavily
on the existence of social niches, of multi-dimensionality of status and of
normative coorientation. The contribution of a broadly conceived structural
approach to a theory of economic activity needs to take them into account.
This is done by acknowledging that, when investing in relationships and trying
to reshape their opportunity structure, actors trigger social mechanisms that
can be vicious or virtuous.
In other words, relation-specific investments are triggers for social mecha-
nisms. This raises a chicken-and-egg issue. We do assume that actors always
act in situations that are already structured, but we do not assume that these
structures entirely determine behaviour. For example UzziÕs (1999) work
166 Conventions and structures in economic organization
shows that organizational change may sometimes come from importing into
the organization (banks) types of ties (social relationships with clients) that are
built outside the organization. Signals providing a structural green light for
specific kinds of imports, however, remain to be examined more closely. Do
actors invest in ties before generalized exchange exists? How do they take a
risk in a situation of uncertainty? In our view, actors may try to import exoge-
nous structures but there is a limit to this process because the number of
(compatible) identity criteria that each of us can credibly use is limited by pre-
existing constraints.
In the next section, based on a case study, we illustrate this point by speci-
fying several social mechanisms (Stinchcombe, 1991; Hedstrm and
Swedberg, 1998) that drive collective action in economic partnerships.
Specifying such mechanisms goes beyond simple statements of embeddedness
seeking to prove the economic efficiency of the existence of social ties, or
Ôrelational capitalÕ. These mechanisms spell out processes that are key to
collective action, mainly exchanges of resources, control of commitment and
oligarchic negotiation of precarious values. A good definition of such mecha-
nisms exemplifies the usefulness of added behavioural assumptions in a struc-
tural approach to economic activities. It also provides new understanding of
the relationship between the micro and macro levels of collective action, not
just a criticism of the limitations of orthodox economic sciences in their
approach to economic activity. In the following sections we sketch a definition
of these mechanisms.
SOCIAL MECHANISMS FOR COOPERATION AT THE
INTRAORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL
Framing the structural contribution to the study of markets and organizations
through the notion of social mechanism goes beyond narrow structuralism.17
Examples of social mechanisms in organizations include solidarity (general-
ized exchange), management of status competition, control and rule enforce-
ment, and ÔconstitutionalÕ processes (that is, redefinition of the rules of the
game). An old sociological tradition focuses on social mechanisms supporting
and enhancing economic performance, beginning with Durkheim in 1893 and
now strongly established (Burt, 1992; Macaulay, 1963; Bourdieu, 1980;
Coleman, 1990; see Flap et al., 1998, and Gabbay, 1997, for a review). Here
maximizing performance not only means improving technology, product and
organizational innovation, managerial coordination or financial management.
It also means maintaining the specific local constellations of relationships that
are the basis of social mechanisms and that help organizations to solve prob-
lems of coordination.18
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This conception of a structural approach of collective action in terms of
social mechanism helps in this analysis of exchange, control and social
change. It is compatible with a theory of action such as that outlined above. In
this section, we illustrate this approach at the intraorganizational level by
using a structural study of a professional partnership. This study offers a
description of the three generic social mechanisms that are needed to sustain
the collegial form of collective action (a multiplex generalized exchange
system, a lateral control regime, and the process of negotiation of precarious
values). Looking at such mechanisms helps in understanding how an organi-
zation provides structural solutions to problems of collective action. These
mechanisms and their efficiency have been examined in a medium-sized
northeastern US corporate law partnership (Lazega, 2001a). Some character-
istics of this firm made it easier to study these mechanisms: in particular, part-
ners had locked themselves in a very cooperative situation and constraining
structure: they have adopted a compensation system that helps (or forces)
them to take a long-term view with regard to cooperation and solidarity; they
can expel one of their own only if there is near unanimity against him or her.
They also belong to a profession that is usually favoured with monopoly
returns, thus loosening the relationship between efficiency, performance and
scarcity of resources.
The firm can indeed be seen as an exchange system for various forms of
resources, and members as (broadly conceived rational) status competitors
managing and accumulating these resources needed to work and survive in
this environment. The production process is based on the use of social ties in
a generalized, multiplex and multilevel exchange system.19 This system is
shown to rest on rules of partner selection and to be effective at cultivating and
mitigating status competition among members. The analysis of the ways in
which these resources are bartered leads to the identification of informal enti-
ties such as niches that are shaped by membersÕ use of the formal structure of
the firm. The effects of relevant differences in membersÕ selective choices of
exchange partners such as hierarchical status (partner/associate), speciality
(litigation/corporate), office membership, gender and law school (Ivy
League/non-Ivy League) are examined to confirm the emergence of these
social niches. The existence of these entities is then used to provide insights
into the way collegial organizations find structural solutions to additional key
problems: first, motivating tenured partners; second, quality control; third,
opportunism in the form of free-riding; and fourth, firm integration.
The firm can also be seen as a control system (against behaviour considered
to be opportunistic, such as shirking) in which issues of cost of control and
rule enforcement are as central, if not more so, as in any form of collective
action. A structural perspective also helps focusing on the relationship between
status and control of enforcement of decisions made by the partnership. This
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issue is of particular importance in formally egalitarian bodies in which
practitioners are all nominal equals and interdependent. Free-rider problems
quickly arise in such settings because even a member who did not contribute
effectively to the firmÕs revenues imposes a cost on the organization as a
whole by reaping the benefits of membership (Olson, 1965). As a conse-
quence, monitoring and policing, especially early graduated sanctions, are
considered to be particularly important for ensuring that membersÕ individ-
ual commitment to contribute remains credible. A second-order free-rider
problem arises as well: the problem of who will bear the costs of monitoring
and enforcement of previous agreements among the formally equal members
(Heckathorn, 1989; Oliver, 1980; Yamagishi, 1986). In such contexts, hier-
archical control being relatively weak, there is reluctance, at an early stage,
to use formal procedures against colleagues to overcome free-riding and
maintain solidarity. Direct command or use of administrative hierarchy are
not considered appropriate means for exercising control because profession-
als have many ways of neutralizing formal authority (Gouldner, 1954;
Freidson, 1975, 1986; Bosk, 1979.) In fact, early monitoring and sanction-
ing in collegial organizations also rely on specific forms of interdependen-
cies in the exchanges of resources to protect overall prosperity against
individual opportunism or parochial interests. Knowledge of such relational
constraints helps to understand how members try to keep early monitoring
costs low, and themselves motivated to carry on monitoring and sanctioning
each other. These constraints take the form of a lateral control regime
(Lazega, 2000b) that is also part of firm social capital in ColemanÕs sense
because it helps peers find an early solution to this second-order free-rider
problem in formally egalitarian interdependent groups. In this regime, status,
particularly that of members called Ôprotectors of the common goodÕ, is
shown to be central. Thanks to this social mechanism, individuals find it
advantageous, credible and safe to pursue contingent commitment to rule
compliance and mutual control.
Beyond economic performance (Lazega, 1999b), the exchange system can
also be shown to be useful in maintaining firm integration, that is, in dealing
with many centrifugal forces threatening the organization (for example,
disputes about sharing profits, secession of rainmakers Ð partners controlling
access to important clients Ð and their more or less permanent team to another
firm, status competition in the work process, disputes between subgroups
representing different offices or specialities). The study shows that members
of a collegial organization have an interest in maintaining a stable oligarchy, a
subset of members with various form of status. Oligarchs are often under pres-
sure not to fight. They are all the more appreciated in that they do not raise
controversies, keep a low profile and present their agreements as renegotiable.
Multi-dimensionality of status comes usually with processes that help the
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collegial organization maintain a balance of powers between oligarchs. This is
the case at this law firm, where economic and administrative powers are sepa-
rate, informally but in a strong structural way. This allows two forms of soli-
darity and integration to coexist, one based on a Ôwelfare systemÕ of
bureaucratic distribution of work, the other on an informal and ÔclientelisticÕ
distribution. Each form of solidarity (welfare and clientelistic) is made possi-
ble by members with different forms of status in the organizations (ÔmindersÕ,
who are more responsible for the long-term time frame in the organization,
and ÔfindersÕ who bring in and control access to new clients) that are kept
dependent upon each other. In many ways a collegial organization replaces an
autocrat with a set of oligarchs who prevent each other from accumulating
enough resources to be independent. Collegiality (thus called polycracy)
presupposes the interdependency of oligarchs. Cohesion in the oligarchy is
reached by a balance of powers and integration  la Montesquieu (Lazega,
1992b, 2000a; Kuty, 1998). Maintaining heterogeneity and interdependence of
forms of status is often the condition under which rivalry among oligarchs
leads to equilibrium.
Finally, this structural approach also helps us to understand the Ôconstitu-
tionalÕ process of such collective actors by looking at their membersÕ negotia-
tion of precarious values underlying policy options and derived rules of social
exchange. As seen above, in the section on symbolic interactionism and roles,
members of an organization do not have rigid overarching Ôcommon valuesÕ
(Crozier and Friedberg, 1977) and derived rules. For example, in decisions on
recruitment through cooptation, peers often reach a conflict between loyalty
(typically clientelistic criterion) and excellence (ideally bureaucratic crite-
rion). Managerial, professional and entrepreneurial ideologies can conflict in
the redefinition of organizational rules and policies. Actors, if they want to
win, sometimes have to redefine their priorities in terms of values (Friedberg,
1993). In a collegial organization, for example, partners feel free to develop
their own conception of professionalism. They calculate their interests, but
they also ÔnegotiateÕ their values (Kuty, 1998). They must accept debates
concerning professionalism even when members with superior economic
power (for example controlling access to large and lucrative clients) try to
impose their own hierarchy of values, their own rules of the game, their terms
for multiplex exchanges. In particular, given that no member can have the last
word once and for all in such discussions, a modus vivendi is usually estab-
lished among them. A structural approach can help understand, in part, this
modus vivendi.
A structural approach looks at the social mechanism helping members
control this constitutional process in the firm, that is, the renegotiation of the
rules of the game. A precarious value (Selznick, 1957) is one that is essential
to the viability of the collectivity but in which most members may have no
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direct stake. Examples of precarious values include, in collegial organizations,
hierarchical authority and professional ethical principles. Subunits fight for
the particular values entrusted to them and may continually redefine them to
assert their priority over potentially competing values. Client satisfaction,
internal coordination, innovation and quality of professional knowledge, soci-
etal needs and employee interests would not be defended or promoted if not
represented by powerful subunits or members to whom the values in question
are paramount, and the organization as a whole would be the poorer (Simpson,
1971).
This social mechanism helps collegial organizations solve the problem of
endless deliberation about norms and values, and thus about firm management
policies regarding issues such as compensation, peer review, work intake and
assignment, marketing, and many others.20 It is shown to make use of the
multi-dimensionality of status ahead of the deliberations themselves. It
consists in authorizing specific forms of status consistency so as to prevent
certain legitimate values from being later defended forcefully by the appropri-
ate oligarchs. In effect, regulatory decisions are also made from within the
organizational exchange system. The social mechanism of definition of rules
is based on a selection of bi- or multi-status oligarchs who play a leadership
role by defining priorities.21 Their selection brings into the deliberation only
oligarchs who have several forms of status and represent several precarious
values, thus able to give priority to one of these forms without disqualifying
the others. The negotiation of precarious values, or the emergence of a prior-
ity value, requires a cohesive core of multi-status oligarchs clearly identified
with such values and in a position to defend their rank with their peers, if not
to prescribe them to each other. In short, the debate about precarious values
uses in a constraining way the heterogeneity of sources of status observed by
the classics. Structure mediates between interests and values because oligarchs
can promote some norms and conventions while playing down the importance
of others (Lazega, 2000e).
This is also part of the politicization of exchanges as defined above and as
part of cumulating power in the sense of capacity to set premises and to define
terms of exchanges. Structural approaches remain limited as long as they are
not associated with the study of forms of politicization of exchanges allowing
for the circulation of resources, that is, the choice of exchange rules among
members. This work, however, goes beyond the capacity of narrow structural-
ism to use qualitative methods. Rules surely have an endogenously dynamic
dimension. They develop within a relational structure and they themselves
have an effect on the evolution of these structures, especially through their
influence on the selection of exchange partners (see Kellerhals et al., 1988 for
an example). In this field, much remains to be done.
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SOCIAL MECHANISMS OF COOPERATION AT THE
INTERORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL IN STUDIES OF
MARKETS
At the beginning of this chapter, we argued that the social mechanisms char-
acterizing collective action at the intraorganizational level, as well as their
modelling, may also characterize collective action and coordination at the
interorganizational level. Beyond early structural approaches that were often
limited to statements of embeddedness, the same broadly conceived structural
approach can be used to look at organizations as actors trying to structure their
environment and shape their opportunity structure, and at the derived mecha-
nisms of cooperation.
Specifically, we argue that the collegial form of organization (and its
network analysis) offers models for examining the social organization of a
market economy, an economy that is not bureaucratized by state planning,
especially for the coordination of activities among interdependent entrepre-
neurs. This does not mean that the state does not intervene in such an economy,
but that its interventions are now looked at as competing with those of all the
other stakeholders of the economy, including small and medium-sized business
groups, large multinationals, independent or supranational watchdogs and regu-
latory bodies, and many other organizational entities. In this organizational
society, the state still wields strong powers Ð not least power of legitimate
violence Ð but so do some of the other entities that play an entrepreneurial role
or control the circulation and allocation of enormous amounts of resources. In
addition, there are many levels of cooperation between the two ideal-type
models of collective action, as well as within each type. Levels of involvement
in cooperation go from temporary but multiplex contracts (such as that charac-
terizing services industries) to strong alliances and eventually mergers.
Organizations, whether public administrations or private businesses, do not
conduct their affairs as isolated units. Their resource dependencies (Salancik
and Pfeffer, 1977) force them to form cooperation ties with other organiza-
tions, and these relationships are expressed by more or less clear legal and
social boundaries.22 Recall that Levine and White (1961) already framed
interorganizational relationships in terms of exchanges of resources and
resource dependencies (Aldrich and Marsden, 1988). Resources exchanged
through multiplex ties at that level can be learning goods, services that may or
may not come attached to financial credit and so on. This view underlies
Harrison WhiteÕs seminal work (1981b; 2001) in which transfers and
exchanges of production-related resources are the defining features of produc-
tion markets. It is the basis of the sociological approach to markets as social
institutions facilitating exchanges without being reduced to price definition
mechanisms (for a summary, see Swedberg, 1994).
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Is this extension to cooperation at the interorganizational level (of a reality
previously examined at the micro level) acceptable? To what extent are higher
order entities such as organizations ÔrationalÕ in a broad sense? Individuals,
when they represent organizations and make decisions on behalf of them,
make a special effort to be efficient costÐbenefit maximizers. But do their
organizations select ÔidentitiesÕ and get involved in ÔsocialÕ exchanges in order
to shape their opportunity structure? Does it make sense, at that level, to get
involved in identity politics, to join meso-level niches for better and easier
access to resources?23 Does cooperation at the interorganizational level rely on
any form of social discipline that can be differentiated from a purely utilitar-
ian attitude? The same question applies to competition for status, that is, for
better control of the terms of exchange and prices of resources, or for rule
enforcement and regulatory clout. A positive answer could make it worthwhile
to identify multiplex social mechanisms for collective action because it would
provide a new vision of productive systems in regions, sectors or other levels.
It would lead structural approaches towards a more general theory of collec-
tive action at the meso and macro levels. There is certainly no scale invariance
with regard to rationality and social phenomena, but it is nevertheless possible
to assume that, just like individuals, organizations follow similarly politicized
principles when making decisions concerning transactions with partners such
as other organizations (Raub and Weesie, 2000). This, however, is a true chal-
lenge for a broadly conceived structural economic sociology. Nevertheless,
elements of answers to the above questions Ð the first building blocks of this
structural research programme in economic sociology Ð are available already.
All exchanges between organizations are not necessarily ÔpurelyÕ market
exchanges. For many years, research has been conducted on the ways in which
individuals working in or running such social settings, even if they often tend
to behave as ÔrationallyÕ as possible (by definition of the organization of
work), also use them for purposes that are not immediately and directly
connected to purely focused production activities. In many such situations,
costÐbenefit calculations, with regard to many activities, although mechani-
cally performed, have a fictitious dimension. For firm A, putting a precise
price tag on a specific R&D operation involving cooperation between its own
scientists and that of firm B is formally possible, but it is a bet that very often
does not reflect any clearly defined costs or market value for the outcome of
this operation. For the same companies, putting up a million Euros to support
a political campaign is also an expense measurable in monetary terms, but the
amount of this form of investment cannot be reduced to a price as usually
defined on a market (again, a rational value that can be associated with a spec-
ified outcome). Many such expenses and investments cannot be traced back to
clear costÐbenefit calculations. The price of trying to structure oneÕs environ-
ment to get ÔPareto protectionÕ is not easily defined. To look at them, in part,
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as forms of relational investments or social exchange is useful in the sense that
such practices, which are important for economic activity, have a logic that
differs from the price mechanism. Our point is that this logic can easily be
compared to that of social exchange, and lead to the niche building and status
competition examined above.
Although the conditions under which such exchanges can be defined as
barter are not entirely spelled out yet, it is helpful to assume that they can be
and that organizational politics include learning the mechanics of social
exchange: this perspective brings together various contributions by structural
sociologists in that domain.
Social Niches and Status Competition at the Interorganizational Level
Actual structural network studies of multiplex ties in interorganizational
ÔfieldsÕ (DiMaggio, 1986) are rare because such data are sensitive and strate-
gic. Visible elite family ties, for example, no longer constitute a strong basis
for social discipline in the business world, as they did in 19th-century forms
of capitalism (Berle and Means, 1932; Chandler, 1977). Therefore, in order to
look at contributions, at the interorganizational level, to the broadly conceived
structural approach outlined here, it is useful to focus directly on pioneering
work echoing more or less directly our reasoning about niches and about
status. Concerning niches,24 DiMaggio (1986) exhorted organizational
analysts to reason in terms of observed patterns of exchange relations. As
mentioned above, a few exceptional studies in the 1980s Ð pioneering in their
analyses of transfers and exchanges of resources Ð were conducted with this
preoccupation in mind (for a presentation of their place in the history of
market analyses, see Swedberg, 1994). For example, it is possible to read
BerkowitzÕs work (1982, 1988; Berkowitz and Fitzwilliam, 1995) as a first
approach to niche building. As seen above, this author combines control (inter-
lock ties) and ownership (capitalistic) ties among companies to provide early
network modelling of market structures. He defines new entities called Ôenter-
prisesÕ, then Ômarket-areasÕ as a new kind of clustering of production activities
in which these enterprises operate and get new business footings. Although he
does not provide much understanding of how these ÔenterprisesÕ operate, these
new contours also offer an original overlay of competitive markets at various
levels of complexity, one that is separable from more standard technology-
based approaches.
Studies of business groups (including conglomerates such as Japanese
keiretsus and Korean chaebols) could also be used as proxies for systematic
detection of social niches. Selection of exchange partners may be studied
through choices of suppliers, subcontractors or distributors that are in them-
selves investments in relationships. GranovetterÕs (1994) programmatic text
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on business groups also exemplifies this structural approach to interorganiza-
tional ties. He considers business groups to be interorganizational entities in
which exchanges of resources are dense and multiplex, but who also raise
ÔprivateÕ, non-tariff barriers to economic dealings with the ÔoutsideÕ of the
cartel, thus restraining trade. There are forms of particularistic solidarity, ways
of giving premiums to loyalty, that are more or less visible. Sharing costs of
exploring new markets, lower financial costs of raising capital, sharing
personnel and so on are indicators of such forms of solidarity even among
competitors. Granovetter (1994) offers a research programme on business
groups, which he defines as formal and informal federations of companies that
constitute a more or less coherent social structure.25 He emphasizes the fact
that in many countries the choice between a business group federation and
consolidation is affected not only by economic contingencies, but also by
political and symbolic factors. Ties between organizations include commercial
transactions, but also mutual ownership, solidarity ties based on religion, polit-
ical allegiances, ethnicity and family or regional ties. Granovetter includes
moral constraints as a component of the social discipline underlying economic
transactions in such business groups.26 Such formal and informal ties allow
them to become more than the sum of their parts. Coordination depends on this
embeddedness of economic decisions in social ties. Systematic data about
these phenomena are obviously missing.
In effect, in business groups, for example, connected partners both force
and help their managers to deal with and share common risks. It is at the level
of groups that real risks are taken in business strategy, but only when member
organizations are mobilized and committed to carrying out such policies.
These ties can be analysed as multiplex networks of easier access to capital,
information and personnel, but also strategic advice with or without transac-
tions or common responsibilities. These resources give a concrete meaning to
the term ÔgroupÕ, even when multiplexity is reduced compared to what it can
be at the intraorganizational level. This presupposes the capacity to detect
meso-level forms of bonded solidarity that represent forms of short-term ratio-
nality embedding themselves in longer-term rationality on which they depend.
Studying groups is not easy: these resources must be sharable and appropri-
able ones, both at the national and the international levels (Boccara, 1999a,
1999b). Unpredictability and uncertainties are delegated or passed on to
subcontractors or to certain categories of employees; those at the lower end of
the dumping chain (whose labour contracts become increasingly ÔflexibleÕ)
incur the maximum of risks and costs. The social structure is thus key to show-
ing a process of risk allocation.27
An empirical phenomenon that provides an opportunity to look at niches
based on ties with exchange partners is the phenomenon of strategic alliances.
This topic has received considerable attention in the organizations and business
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strategy literatures (for example, Gulati, 1995; Uzzi, 1997). Firms establish
alliances because they expect benefits from access to resources provided by
such ties. Organization scholars have been particularly impressed by the learn-
ing advantages of these alliances which provide firms with fresh know-how
and skills (Kogut and Zander, 1996; Powell et al., 1996). However, the exis-
tence of Ôknowledge nichesÕ has not been examined as an object in a social and
relational space, only as a phenomenon characterizing a Ôtechnological spaceÕ
(see below).28
From the perspective outlined here, it is worth arguing that three
approaches to the existence of social niches remain underdeveloped. The first
is concerned with the role of state administrations (and associated corps dÕEtat
in countries such as France) in the creation of social ties among executives.
The second is the role of the non-profit sector (Anheier and Seibel, 1990),
including business schools, in the creation of such ties, a role that has not been
fully exposed. The third is that of illegally (trust) cooperative ties in which
information and commitments are exchanged (Baker and Faulkner, 1993,
Baker et al., 1998). Looking at such niche-building contexts that bring
together businesses for various purposes should be a productive area of
research.
The second concept that could be used to account for social mechanisms at
the interorganizational level is that of multidimensional status competition.
The concept of status has been only partly exploited in a broadly conceived
structural approach to markets. It is still not very clear how status exists at the
interorganizational level, at least from a perspective combining social and
market exchange. Studying market uncertainty, Podolny (1993, 1994; Podolny
and Stuart, 1995) uses this traditional concept to account for the selection of
business partners. Firms use evaluations of status to signal quality and select
exchange partners. Partners with status inspire confidence, attract risk-averse
customers and are able to define favourable terms of exchange with lesser
status partners. This use of the concept, however useful at early stages of struc-
tural analyses of markets, remains vague because the various dimensions of
status are not clearly defined and compared; power generated by the concen-
tration of various kinds of social resources is neglected. In spite of its concep-
tual weakness, this work nevertheless shows how difficult it is today to look
into interdependencies between entrepreneurs, even at the descriptive stage,
and how useful it would be to identify such forms of status more clearly. This
difficulty is even greater at the explanatory level required to account for the
social mechanisms of cooperation. Data for studying these social mechanisms
at the interorganizational level are scarce. Recall that structure is defined as
regularities in multiple resource interdependencies among entrepreneurs with
a business footing; interdependencies are always multiplex (defined for
several resources) and multilateral.
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Finally, the relationships between niche seeking and status competition at the
interorganizational level deserve special attention. Just as endless brainstorming
fuelled by status competition among peers is dealt with (kept under control) by
oligarchs, the latter can also replace dysfunctional markets with more viable
ones, although more brutally at that level (Lazega, 2000e). For example, it is
sometimes indispensable for large companies to agree to impose a common
technological standard without which markets would unravel. At the interorga-
nizational level, the effects of social niches and those of status and power may
not be combined and balanced as efficiently as they can be at the intraorganiza-
tional level, because corporate actors are run by individuals who are trained to
make particular efforts to be as costÐbenefit maximizing as they can. Corporate
leaders still look for social niches, using identities, or membership in ethnic
groups (Saxenian, 1994), but this does not necessarily predispose them to lenient
behaviour when survival is at stake. The fact that oligarchsÕ power may be more
brutal (than it is at the intraorganizational level) does not identify their interven-
tions with those of a formal hierarchy such as a state administrationÕs. At the
interorganizational level, distinctions between status (Weberian Herrschaft) and
raw power (Macht) matter less because power here is less often confronted with
or challenged by various forms of status. Distinctions such as that used by
Hannan and Podolny (legitimacy produced by endorsement) are not always
necessary when power and several forms of authority are concentrated in the
same hands. In this situation, there is not much social exchange: calculating
strategies anticipate the decisions and movements of asymmetrically distributed
resources generated by threatening repositionings of oligarchs (big firms).
Social Mechanisms at the Interorganizational Level
Commonsense accounts of governance of business often have it that, at the
interorganizational level, the notions of private resources and relation-specific
investments seem to be less relevant than at the intraorganizational level. But
this statement is highly questionable. High-level managers need multiple
resources to interact with the interorganizational environment and they usually
do not rely exclusively on resources provided by the formal organization itself
(indeed, they are often hired for their own personal network). The general idea
that studies of relational structures should go beyond the description of
embeddedness and account for social mechanisms that are grounded in
exchanges of resources among firms can actually be found in GranovetterÕs
(1985) own work and in a more recent preoccupation with the Ôgovernance
benefitsÕ of embeddedness.29 Current Ôembeddedness studiesÕ sometimes
provide glimpses of such mechanisms. Given the constraints on data collec-
tion, such studies remain mostly at the dyadic level and are unable to reach (as
intraorganizational studies sometimes do) the structural level.
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At the dyadic level such studies are different from most economic research
on the question of inter-firm arrangements promoting governance benefits for
firms in their interorganizational transactions. This economic research focuses
on how formal ÔgovernanceÕ arrangements, such as contracts, hostage taking
or hierarchy, enable exchange partners to capture gains through trade
(Williamson, 1996; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Raub and Weesie, 1996; Batenburg
et al., 1997). By contrast, recall that other theories argued that governance
benefits are achieved through the embedding of commercial transactions in
social attachments and networks (Granovetter, 1985, 1994). The latter studies
are conducted with thorough investigation of the formal economic structure of
the market (number of firms, concentration, market shares, quality niches,
intermediaries and so on). They offer the equivalent of the above-mentioned
glimpses because they show that social embeddedness offers a useful account
of how social life matters, at the dyadic level, for economic benefits in
markets. Using measurements of social embeddedness in a financial market,
Uzzi (1999) shows that firms get easier access to loans and lower interest rates
from mid-market banks when entrepreneurs maintain social ties to a privileged
bank officer and armÕs-length ties to other bankers. He argues that embedding
commercial transactions in social attachments and networks facilitates dyadic
exchanges by initiating Ôself-organizing governance arrangementsÕ that oper-
ate through expectations of trust and reciprocity and access to private knowl-
edge. At the level of the bankÐfirm tie, increased embeddedness enhances
governance benefits. FirmsÕ networks composed of a complementary mix of
embedded and armÕs-length ties are said to produce optimal governance by
reducing the need for costly formal governance of loan contracts.
Another example of research that comes close to identifying social mecha-
nisms based on niche seeking and status competition is that of Podolny and
Stuart (1999). Building on their previous work (1995) on patents citations,
they show that position in what they call a Ôtechnological spaceÕ can drive
alliances and their performances in specific industries.30 This technological
space is thus assumed to have its own dynamics,31 which, together with firmsÕ
considerations of relative ÔstatusÕ, would drive the evolution of the industry.
This evolution is thus linked to considerations of power (that are considered
social structural in that they are different in nature from technology). Although
it assumes the existence of an exchange system (of which alliances would be
an indicator) between firms, this research does not examine it as a multiplex
and structural phenomenon. Rather, it switches to a different (more ecological)
conception of ÔnicheÕ to account for survival of firms in the industry. Podolny
et al., (1996) develop a conception of an organization-specific niche (defined
by ÔcrowdingÕ and ÔstatusÕ Ð itself built from citations of an organizationÕs
patent portfolio, not through analysis of dense and multiplex exchanges of
resources) in a technological network to show that it can enhance the firmÕs
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growth and survival chances.32 This approach loses even WhiteÕs insight about
the importance of structural equivalence (with respect to the pattern of ties to
upstream and downstream organizations) for niche building, not to mention
the importance of any form of density in the exchanges between firms.33
Nevertheless, there is much to learn from these studies in terms of looking at
outcomes such as survival, growth rates and innovation as effects of niche
building and status competition, as described above.
The importance of niche seeking and status competition for control and
enforcement of regulation has largely escaped analysis up to now. Status
competition may make sense at the interorganizational level even in an
increasingly oligarchic (monopolistic or duopolistic) forms of competition.
Niches, often identifiable through either corruption or violation of antitrust
laws, make sense at that level when rents cannot be extracted from a monop-
olistic position. The balance between status competition and niche seeking is
in itself the very stuff of competition policies that are attempts to regulate
production and exchanges on markets.
More even than at the intraorganizational level, relation-specific invest-
ments between organizations raise the problem of sunk costs (when on party
behaves opportunistically) and therefore social mechanisms, in addition to
legal ones, are also needed here to deal with first- and second-order free-
riding. For example, the issue of commercial justice can be framed in terms of
formal external regulation (Hawkins, 1984; Reiss, 1984; Shapiro, 1984;
Vaughan, 1983, 1996) or self-regulation (Lazega, 1994b, 2001a; Lazega and
Mounier, forthcoming), but also in terms of more informal conflict resolution
mechanisms (Macaulay, 1963) or private arbitration practices created by
corporate law firms (Dezalay and Garth, 1999). The contribution of social ties
(and derived niches and forms of status) to social control mechanisms in the
business world remain, to our knowledge, poorly studied. Governance mech-
anisms in WilliamsonÕs (1996; also Raub and Weesie, 1993) sense only scratch
the surface of all the processes that help interdependent entrepreneurs monitor
and sanction each other before (or through) resorting to well-defined but
costly court procedures (Cheit and Gersen, 2000; Dunworth and Rogers, 1996;
Macaulay, 1963; Rooks et al., 2000) and how society attempts to exercise
control over their activities.34
Finally, since niche building and status competition are inseparable from a
politicization of economic activity, attention has also focused on political
management of economic activity, but in a way that does not yet provide new
general insights on political economy. Neoclassical economics with its ideol-
ogy of pure competition has often permeated studies of markets. WhiteÕs and
BurtÕs approaches helped question such views by connecting reasoning in
terms of network analysis with ideas on monopolistic competition. But they do
not focus on how economic actors such as interdependent firms spend time
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and resources structuring their environment so as to escape competitive
markets. As well described by Pareto and Schumpeter, entrepreneurs as polit-
ical ÔcourtesansÕ try to dump market competition on others, and to look for
niches in which rents and discounts are available. If organizations follow this
logic as well, it makes sense to assume that they all vie both for collusion
(Baker and Faulkner, 1998) with specific suppliers, subcontractors and
consumers, and for forms of status that would both attract clients and give
them power to negotiate terms of trade with partners outside the niche.
Markets are often rigged and constructed in interorganizational contexts in
which power is usually in the hands of a very politicized establishment. In this
establishment, actors recognize each other or identify with one another (using
identity criteria) and act politically to keep their shared power, instead of (or
at the same time) competing, for example, on the basis of innovation.
However, unsurprisingly, data are also missing to test the effect of such
behaviour and check for the existence of the self-regulatory social mecha-
nisms underlying transactions among firms. The influence of niche seeking
and status competition on regulatory work is also a domain that is underre-
searched. Institutional economics and sociology have often looked at contexts
in which economic activities and competition take place as legally and cultur-
ally defined (Hirsch, 1997). Markets cannot emerge without appropriate legal
property rights, and also many derived rules such as bankruptcy laws, that are
defined and negotiated in a political sphere (Carruthers and Halliday, 1998).
Fligstein and Mara-DritaÕs (1996) work on the construction of the European
common market fleshes out this idea of politically constructed competition,
with an important role played especially by the state. Fligstein distinguishes
stages of market development, calling attention to endogenously formed insti-
tutions as sources of order, echoing WhiteÕs approaches to niches and adding
focus on firms Ôconceptions of controlÕ. But truly structural studies of the
regulatory process (using measurements of multiple forms of status and power
in complex oligarchies negotiating the rules of the game) are almost non-exis-
tent.
The effect of resource dependencies on the capacities of some actors to
redefine the rules, the terms of exchange and priority values, has barely been
examined, with the exception of studies of lobbying such as that of Laumann
and Knoke (1987) and Pappi and Knig (1995). Criticism for such a lack of
interest for data collection has long been around (Fligstein, 1990; forthcom-
ing). Studies of intraorganizational relational structures have been used to look
at the reasons for which some businesses try to redefine the rules of their
competition (Lazega, 1994b) as they apply to their sector, for example rules
about conflicts of interests in corporate law services. Professional firms use
organizational devices to reassure the market about the ethics of their
economic behaviour. Another example of regulatory effort is provided by
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struggles to impose a standard upstream of production (not so much for market
share in mature markets). Such standards can even be called for by first- and
second-rank subcontractors who prefer universal standards even if they
impose a cascade of new adjustments and constraints. But very few structural
studies have been able to show how organizations participate in shaping their
normative and regulatory environment. Concerning the study of that generic
mechanism, which is the most visibly politicized of all such mechanisms,
almost all remains to be done. The dynamics that it calls for are only barely
perceived.
We know that companies pay large campaign contributions to ruling polit-
ical parties (Useem, 1984; Carruthers, 1996). Lobbying studies mentioned
above, while examining the influence of interorganizational networks on
policy making (Laumann and Knoke, 1987; Pappi and Koenig, 1995; Stokman
et al., 2000), and on attempts to use and impose their industry customs and
rules on others (Swedberg, 1993), show how economic policy is partly shaped
by lobbying practices of large companies and industries. This is, however,
where a more complex behavioural assumption about corporate actors (such
as that used above when outlining a theory of politicized appropriateness judg-
ment) is needed to make progress. A broadly conceived structural approach
must focus on such regulatory activities much more than it has up to date. In
our view, this is precisely where conventions and structures combine (Lazega,
1999a, 2001a). In particular, various dimensions of economic status need to be
differentiated in order to look at various forms of influence in the regulatory
process.
In sum, pioneering structural studies of interorganizational ties suggest the
feasibility of more systematic examination of social mechanisms and their role
in the economy, but, owing to lack of access to data, very little has been
achieved in that respect. Studies in progress nevertheless illustrate the search
for various forms of balance between collegiality and bureaucracy in different
kinds of collective actors (Comet, 2001; Stofer, 2001; Varanda, 2001;
Wattebled, 2001) producing both standardized and unstandardized goods,
particularly by looking at the social mechanisms that help their potential or
actual rival members in their efforts to cooperate.
CONCLUSION: A PERMANENTLY SHIFTING BOUNDARY
BETWEEN BUREAUCRACY AND COLLEGIALITY AT
THE INTERORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL
In this chapter, we have sought to evaluate the extent to which it is possible to
reason at the interorganizational level in the same terms as at the intraorgani-
zational level. Do interdependent corporate actors get involved in multiplex
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social exchange and politicize their behaviour through niche seeking and
status competition? If so, does this lead to social mechanisms such as those
identified at the intraorganizational level? In that case, it would have many
consequences in reasoning about policy, given the existence of macrosocio-
logical constraints that need to be taken seriously.
Switching from the intraorganizational level to the interorganizational level
with the same theory is not an obvious research programme. Nevertheless, the
ingredients of an ÔextendedÕ structural contribution to the study of markets and
organizations, one that goes beyond the contribution of pioneering structural
studies, was presented above. From this perspective, economic sociology does
not need to start with the distinction of markets and hierarchies. It is based on
a different conception of the economy, one in which it is too limiting to explain
the emergence of collective actors such as organizations or groups of organi-
zations as a result of a Ômake or buyÕ decision based on the evaluation of trans-
action costs and what they would otherwise be on a supposedly unstructured
market. Rather it is much closer to a strategic analysis of economic activity,
and to political economy.
It is based on a conception of rationality that is broader than traditional
rational choice. It includes economic calculus but integrates also symbolic
reasoning allowing bounded solidarity and politicized exchanges of multiple
resources, delegation of control and deliberation on precarious values. It
allows for actorsÕ attempts at shaping their opportunity structure at the (analyt-
ically speaking) meso level, whether inside or between organizations. In many
ways, we would like to argue that it is a broadly conceived structural approach
that can bridge the gap between economic and sociological approaches to
coordination of collective action.
The specificity of broadly conceived structural studies is in their use of
network analysis as a method for tracking and understanding flows and
exchanges of resources, their control, and negotiation of rules commanding
such flows and terms of exchanges. We argued that the models developed to
analyse social mechanisms allowing for cooperation between interdependent
entrepreneurs at the intraorganizational level can offer insights into, and
hypotheses for, the study of interorganizational cooperation between interde-
pendent entrepreneurs. Based on such an approach to economic activity, the
strong difference between markets and organizations tends to be replaced by
the dialectic interplay between mechanisms characterizing bureaucracy and
collegiality in each of the two contexts. These mechanisms are triggered by
selective investments in relationships within social niches and for status
competition. They represent a meso-level social and cultural discipline that
underlie both intraorganizational and interorganizational coordination.
Every organization and/or interorganizational system, however, is different
with respect to the temporary balance between bureaucracy (that shapes
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collective action for standardized, more repetitive, production) and collegial-
ity (that shapes collective action for unstandardized, more innovative, produc-
tion) that it can achieve. One of todayÕs most intriguing issues in theoretical
economic sociology is perhaps to figure out a typology of equilibrium points
between the two models. Because real-life organizations are different and
because they change, the boundary between the two is permanently being
redefined, and these kinds of balance are moving targets. A theory of these
equilibrium points can therefore only be developed by using longitudinal
approaches and analyses of the dynamics of organizational and interorganiza-
tional structures.
Current research insists on multiplexity, on constraints coming from multi-
ple relationships between exchange partners, whose recurrent interactions
compose relational structures maintained by sanctions and helping in enforc-
ing formal contracts. These contributions use multiplex databases very little.
A quick review of the literature on this issue shows that economic sociology
develops very slowly in that respect. This rhythm is due to difficulties related
to systematic data collection, particularly on economic transactions (buying
and selling) between sets of organizations (such as groups, or local or regional
industries, or Ômarket areasÕ in BerkowitzÕs sense, or more standard sectors).
Measuring commercial ties is difficult; combining such measurements with
systematic information on social ties among actors is even more difficult.
Accounting and social data are strategic to companies (especially with respect
to competition and regulatory authorities). Therefore social niches and status
competition Ð and derived mechanisms Ð are not easily detectable empirically.
Most of the work therefore remains to be done in that respect. In particular,
more research is needed on actorsÕ investments in social exchange and on the
social mechanisms of cooperation (among individuals or among organiza-
tions) that such investments trigger. In addition, generic mechanisms are
connected to each other: the last two (control and regulation) are attempts to
protect the first: bounded solidarity between interdependent entrepreneurs.
This broadly conceived structural approach, and especially the challenge of
using multiplexity in intraorganizational and interorganizational studies, has the
potential to renew economic sociology. Although many ÔembeddednessÕ studies
assert the importance of social ties and ÔgiftsÕ for individual economic perfor-
mance, the embeddedness framework has often justified lack of efforts from
researchers to look for complete networks and structural solutions provided for
basic problems of collective action such as solidarity, control and regulation.
Only complete network data of specific intraorganizational and interorganiza-
tional systems, at several points in time, can provide systematic ways of linking
micro and macro levels of analysis by describing relation-specific investments
and social mechanisms derived from them. Unless such methodological efforts
are made, multi-level structural studies of organizational change and evolution of
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markets will remain even scarcer. A thorough understanding of the organizational
society and its social mechanisms will not be developed. Organizations and
markets must be held accountable, to some extent, for some of their externalities
and social costs. Much more remains to be done in order to fulfil this goal.
NOTES
1. A first draft of this paper was presented at the 1998 Cnrs Summer school on ÔMarkets and
OrganizationsÕ, at the Maison Suger in Paris. It was revised for presentation at the Seminar
of Economic Sociology at the Maison des Sciences de lÕHomme, Nantes, November 2000,
then at the Seminar of Economic Sociology at the University of Paris IX-Dauphine, January
2001, and finally at the Journes du Clers on ÔThe Social Organization of the EconomyÕ,
University of Lille 1, June 2001. We would like to thank the organizers of these events as
well as Sbastien Delarre, Alexis Ferrand, and Andr Torre for their comments on a previ-
ous version.
2. We do recognize (Lazega, 1996) the heuristical value and usefulness of this distinction for
economists opposed to the neoclassical dogma, from Williamson (1975) to Favereau (1989).
3. Order imposed by a tightly connected oligarchic banking system can sometimes have the
same effect on society, especially when the state delegates some of its power of legitimate
use of violence (Lazega and Mounier, forthcoming).
4. For general network analysis, see Wasserman and Faust (1994). For the specific network
models that test for the existence of social mechanisms of generalized exchange, lateral
control and self-regulation in a collegial organization, see the references to our more tech-
nical papers in the bibliography.
5. Several papers provide overviews of this early work (see, for example Swedberg, 1994;
Lazega, 1994a) and demonstrate how useful network analysis combined with even this mini-
mal theory of action can be to economic sociology and its many substantive topics.
6. Burt (1988) observes stability at the ultimate macro level of aggregation using Leontief
inputÐoutput tables of national accounts (where the organization is lost as a unit of analy-
sis), markets tend to be stable in the social structure of production relations with suppliers
and consumers. In his view, for example, multiplexity of ties (or resource dependencies)
between organizations does not play any role in the mechanisms that account for stability in
markets. This stability is conceived of as entirely ÔstructuralÕ without any behavioural
assumption at that level of aggregation.
7. For a detailed presentation of WhiteÕs market models, see White (1981b, 2001), but also
Eymard-Duvernay and Favereau (1990), Biencourt et al., (1994a, 1994b, and Chapter 6 in
this book). For an analysis of the effects of introducing uncertainty about quality of goods
in the analysis of economic activity, see also Karpik (1989).
8. This symbolic activity may be partly construed as a form of interpretation, as conventional-
ists understand this term.
9. On the relationships between network analysis and strategic analysis, see Lemieux (1982)
and Lazega (1994a).
10. A generalized exchange system refers to the existence of cycles of postponed and indirect
reciprocity. In the case of organizations, cycles are often short, involving only three or four
persons; nevertheless, they indicate the existence of a form of bounded solidarity and social
discipline.
11. A social niche is not necessarily a group because it does not always have the legitimacy that
would be granted to an independent entity by an outside authority. The organization can
recognize the importance of niches for efficient circulation of resources, but it does not
favour the emergence of detachable subunits. Just as a social niche can be either a shelter or
hell for an individual member, it can be an advantage or a threat for the organization that
encompasses it (Lazega, 2000a).
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12. This conception of the relationship between rationality and protectionism is entirely compat-
ible with ParetoÕs approach to entrepreneurial activity, except that it does not consider it to
be a ÔresidualÕ form of activity.
13. On the relationship between identity, appropriateness judgments and contextualized behav-
iour, see Lazega (1992a; 1997).
14. For additional insights into cooperation as routine transfers or exchanges of various kinds of
resources, see Bearman (1997), Breiger and Ennis (1997), Cook (1987, 1990), Ekeh (1976),
Flap et al., (1998), Galaskiewicz and Marsden (1978), Gouldner (1960), Granovetter (1994),
Han and Breiger (1999), Lazega and Pattison (1999), Lin (2001, 1995), Levi-Strauss (1949),
Raub and Weesie (1990), Saxenian (1994).
15. As shown by Festinger (1954), the comparisons that matter for people are the comparisons
with others most like themselves. Combination of criteria (office similarities, speciality
similarities, hierarchical status similarities and so on) push members to compare themselves
to same niche people.
16. It is not our purpose to assume that status competition is omnipresent in society. In many
arenas, especially when production is routinized, actors do not try to accumulate resources
and forms of status, thus accepting bureaucratic formal hierarchy. But at the interorganiza-
tional level, among interdependent entrepreneurs, such a competition, although limited by
niche seeking, is in itself an instrument for the definition of terms of exchange, and there-
fore unavoidable.
17. The use of the notion of social mechanism is meant to convey a criticism of the use of the
word ÔgovernanceÕ, which overemphasizes the capacity of management to control collective
action.
18. One feature characterizing this network approach to social mechanisms compared to many
early ones is that it takes into account multiplexity in a much more systematic way. This
accent on several types of resources leads to a more precise understanding of power and
interdependencies among economic actors participating in collective action being needed to
describe social mechanisms. As an example, take the difference between the human relations
tradition and the structural approach to relationships at work (Lazega, 2001a).
19. The combined use of structural analysis and rational choice approach leads to abstract concepts
such as multiplex relationships. The word ÔmultiplexÕ qualifies a rich relationship between two
persons. It refers to the fact that the two persons have a relationship in which they can transfer
and exchange multiple types of resources (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). For example, two part-
ners have a multiplex relationship because they are co-workers on many cases, because they also
seek each other for advice in difficult professional situations, and finally because they also have
social activities outside work together. From a structural perspective, this means that specific
local and multiplex substructures of social ties must crystallize for members to be able to coop-
erate on a continuing basis in the context of wider collective actors such as organizations.
20. One obvious way of controlling the deliberation about rules is to marginalize or exclude
some members from the reference group itself, that is from the collective that is perceived
to be the best arena for interpretation and enforcement of these rules. As previously noted,
racism and other forms of discrimination are never far away from all the mechanisms that
are based on barter and particularism.
21. Constitutional change is not the only form of change that multi-status oligarchs can promote.
They are also in a structurally advantageous position to promote new products because they
can afford both to invest in an innovation and to lose from abandoning the production of
ÔoldÕ products.
22. In many ways, the structural approach has attracted representatives of economics of organi-
zations, often based on transaction costs economics (Williamson, 1975, 1981). However, the
distance between the two approaches remains considerable. For example, in this presenta-
tion, we do not use the word ÔnetworkÕ in the sense of a separate kind of entity that repre-
sents a specific form of coordination of collective action between market and hierarchy, a
third ÔhybridÕ form. Many authors have questioned the usefulness a of transaction costs
approach. Eccles (1985) has shown that in some large organizations transactions (based on
transfer pricing) may be more difficult and costly than outside the organizations. For a
critique of this approach, see Lindenberg (1996) and Lazega (1996).
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23. In particular, one might object that, at the intraorganizational level, one finds a form of
homogeneity between members and a focus on one common objective, two features that
cannot characterize society at large. However, in our view, as in that of strategic analysis,
there is not necessarily a greater heterogeneity of actors and of goals at the interorganiza-
tional level than at the intraorganizational level. Another objection to that approach is that
relationships between organizations are less a product of a choice of exchange partners than
at the intraorganizational level. In our view, however, the choices of partners and level of
investment are not necessarily available to agents within organizations more than between
organizations. Prototypical of such choices is the selection of subcontractors (Lazega and
Mounier, 1999). Equally questionable is the idea that a relation specific investment and the
notion of a private resource make less sense at the interorganizational level than at the intra-
organizational level. As often stressed by embeddedness studies, managers need the multi-
plex resources to run their organization and create markets (White, 2001). They cannot count
exclusively on the resources formally provided by their organization. Relation-specific
investment still raises the problem of sunk costs (when one party behaves opportunistically)
and therefore the social mechanisms of control are also needed (Raub and Weesie, 1993;
Williamson, 1996). But these investments with requests for commitment from the others in
the niche do make sense at the interorganizational level too.
24. It is important to mention again that the niche concept has been the object of important
debates, at least at this interorganizational level. The first protagonist of this debate is
Harrison White, whose niche concept represents a specified level of quality in a quality array
helping consumers compare products and quality/price ratios. This is obviously not the same
meaning as a densely connected subgroup in which members have multiplex ties to one
another, although it is not entirely different insofar as such dense groups are also positions
of approximately structurally equivalent actors (see Borgatti and Everett, 1992, for a de-
dramatization of the distinction between cohesion and structural equivalence). Extending
WhiteÕs approach, Burt and Talmud (1993) also use the niche concept. They do reason in
terms of ties representing transfers and exchanges of various types of resources, but they are
mainly interested in looking for elementary substructures (especially ones that represent the
existence of Ôstructural holesÕ and derived opportunities) that make sense regardless of the
type of tie. This represents a simplification of the structural approach, particularly with
regard to multiplexity, one that earlier contributions did not accept. This approach remains
untested and is different from approaches assuming density of resource flows within the
niche. It is not necessarily different if niches are also dense, since internal density in posi-
tions can increase the level of approximated structural equivalence between actors. But
stressing such ties would introduce arguments about cooperation, not about competition
between members of the niche. Actually, in these studies, interorganizational ties are rarely
measured as such, often derived from similarity along common characteristics (using simi-
lar technology, developing interdependent innovations).
25. Formally, business groups are not simply strategic alliances or consolidated conglomerates.
They are sets of organizations connected for economic, social and political goals. Stable
cartels could be considered business groups. Granovetter uses the example of Korean chae-
bols and Japanese keiretsus, in which many kinds, including symbolic, of resources circu-
late, and where individual companies keep a separate legal identity. These groups include
sets of companies that are neither integrated in a single holding nor completely independent.
They are collective actors that do not exist legally as one single entity and that are not iden-
tified in the official census (Strachan, 1976). Careful attention to groups in other countries
yields similar observations. Such a network may be costly in terms of price, but it might also
be efficient in the long term with regard to innovation, investments, personnel management
and social costs. In addition, sanctions may include marginalization, but also illegal ones
(sometimes carried out by mafias).
26. Granovetter thinks that such groups have characteristics of moral communities in the
Durkheimian sense. Moral constraints may have integrative force for members who know
what behaviour they are entitled to expect from each other, especially with regard to behav-
iour perceived to be opportunistic. However, the effects of moral forces are difficult to
measure and to disentangle from those of economic calculations.
186 Conventions and structures in economic organization
27. This will lead increasingly to research on the capacity of the state to regulate by redefining
firmsÕ social responsibilities and obligations in this new context, particularly those of orga-
nizations and groups of organizations that build internal labour markets.
28. A related issue is that we do not think that sociological research should distinguish, at the
interorganizational level, between social niches and ecological niches. Sociologists such as
Podolny et al., (1996) think that, in the second type of niche, companies depending on the
same resources and endorsement mechanisms making coordination possible are enough to
justify this distinction. In our view, the notion of a social niche encompasses this type of
ecological niche and recognizes that more aggressive power relationships should often char-
acterize interorganizational ties. Power relationships should not be distinguished in nature
from simple ÔendorsementsÕ. Power that seems to be raw power is never very far from legit-
imization; indeed, what makes its use very often so scandalous is the fact that it is actually
and silently legitimized by authorities (such as the state). Organizational ecology does not
address issues of raw power in the ecological niche. Our approach using the idea of a social
niche is an extended view of such entities, one that is able to include both endorsements and
more brutal expressions of power. Organizational ecology and its emphasis on codepen-
dency on similar resources is not to be neglected. Without the power of a hierarchy between
organizations, standardization of products, for example, is impossible and markets destroy
themselves. Just as brainstorming at the intraorganizational level (example used above)
would not stop, owing to status competition, without the intervention of hierarchical status,
markets would not reach any standards. Hierarchy manages what is dysfunctional with the
collegial social niche at the micro and meso levels. This transposition also works with regard
to the use of identities (ethnic groups, Ôclasse patronaleÕ) underlying a social niche. Instead
of asking what triggers the choice of an ecological over a social niche, we think that a social
niche should account for market structuration, including for firmsÕ codependency on similar
resources usually attributed to ecological niches. The social niche does not require only
contacts and relationships; sometimes it also requires power thanks to oneÕs control of
resources. BerkowitzÕs work (see above) can be seen as an example of the overlap of the two
approaches. Actions influenced by the fact that one is a director of a company are not neces-
sarily different from those deriving from the fact that one belongs to the same ethnic group.
In our view, it is simpler to assume that there is only one kind of society in the market, even
if two organizational forms (bureaucracy and collegiality) account for coordination among
its actors.
29. WhiteÕs (2001) approach to production markets actually reasons in terms of mechanisms, but
it assumes their existence more than it actually models them, even from the perspective of
individual entrepreneurs, not to mention the coordination of interdependent ones.
30. Stuart (1998) tries to show that strategic alliances have a positive effect on organizationsÕ
performance (growth and capacity to innovate) when the partners are themselves large and
innovative.
31. Podolny and Stuart (1999) assume a technologically closed ÔspaceÕ, in which inventions at
time t2 are always derived from inventions from that same field at time t1. Inventions in that
industry, however, may come from firms in different industries (plastics, chemistry, biology)
or from labs in the public sector (universities). Thus their account of industry evolution is
limited to specific ÔendogenousÕ processes and (probably) routine developments in the semi-
conductor industry.
32. This certainly improves on Hannan and FreemanÕs (1989) approach to competition in terms
of numbers of producers in an industry. They claim that their definition of a niche is Ôfunda-
mentalÕ, as opposed to ÔrealizedÕ (or based on market exchange relations which, they assert,
have a ÔtransitoryÕ character, that is, defined at one point in time and therefore not constrain-
ing on the actions of an organization). What makes this ÔfundamentalÕ character, however, is
unclear: it may be the stability of the niche over time, or its lack of dependence on agency.
More generally, it is possible to envisage that markets, when not regulated externally by the
state, are structured in two different ways (that is, by two different types of niches): in an
extended ecological way (organizational ecology plus power relationships in the construc-
tion of markets) and in a social way. But the extent to which it is useful to assume that there
are two kinds of society in the market remains to be tested. The two often overlap to such
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an extent that the distinction may be useless. But, in special cases, they may not. For exam-
ple, in private R&D ventures, social niches may matter much more than extended ecologi-
cal ones. A social niche requires heavy reliance on contacts, relationships and associated
social mechanisms. The extended ecological niche simply requires a way to notifying the
other parties of oneÕs power over them via unchallengeable control of vital resources. The
second is easier to enforce. Structures being multi-level, social niches might need a level of
structuration that is superior in order to gain the level of influence that has the same effect
as power in the extended ecological niche.
33. Such an approach was extended by the recent look at activities of endorsement (Podolny et
al., 1996) and at coordination based on more aggressive power relationships, which was
neglected in population ecology and recent attempts to combine it with structural sociol-
ogy.
34. For example, control at the interorganizational level is being examined in a study of the
balance between external (state-controlled) regulation and self-regulation of the business
world in a study of commercial courts in France (Lazega and Mounier, forthcoming). In
these courts, ÔconsularÕ (that is, not professional) and voluntary judges are appointed by the
business community through the Chamber of Commerce. These judges come from various
sectors of the economy, but mostly from banking and financial services, sectors that are
particularly well positioned to exercise control at the interorganizational level when state
agencies withdraw from part of their enforcement tasks. While performing such tasks,
competitors do rely on this social discipline in order to cooperate, thus combining Ôbureau-
craticÕ and ÔcollegialÕ models of collective action.
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